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a b s t r a c t 
Background: With at least 94 countries undergoing or exiting lockdowns for contact suppression to con- 
trol the COVID-19 outbreak, sustainable and public health-driven exit strategies are required. Here we 
explore the impact of lockdown and exit strategies in Singapore for immediate planning. 
Methods: We use an agent-based model to examine the impacts of epidemic control over 480 days. A 
limited control baseline of case isolation and household member quarantining is used. We measure the 
impact of lockdown duration and start date on final infection attack sizes. We then apply a 3-month 
gradual exit strategy, immediately re-opening schools and easing workplace distancing measures, and 
compare this to long-term social distancing measures. 
Findings: At baseline, we estimated 815 400 total infections (21.6% of the population). Early lockdown 
at 5 weeks with no exit strategy averted 18 500 (2.27% of baseline averted), 21 300 (2.61%) and 22 400 
(2.75%) infections for 6, 8 and 9-week lockdown durations. Using the exit strategy averted a correspond- 
ing 114 700, 121 700 and 126 000 total cases, representing 12.07–13.06% of the total epidemic size under 
baseline. This diminishes to 9 900–11 300 for a late 8-week start time. Long-term social distancing at 6 
and 8-week durations are viable but less effective. 
Interpretation: Gradual release exit strategies are critical to maintain epidemic suppression under a new 
normal. We present final infection attack sizes assuming the ongoing importation of cases, which require 
preparation for a potential second epidemic wave due to ongoing epidemics elsewhere. 
Funding: Singapore Ministry of Health, Singapore Population Health Improvement Centre. 
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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Research in context 
Evidence before this study 
Contact suppression through lockdown and enhanced so- 
cial distancing measures remains the frontline defence in 
suppressing the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic with approx- 
imately 9.2 million cases and 477 0 0 0 deaths globally at 
the time of writing. With at least 94 countries undergo- 
ing or leaving lockdown, there are widespread public health 
concerns of case resurgence due to ongoing international ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: ephcar@nus.edu.sg (A.R. Cook). 
1 These authors contributed equally. 
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanwpc.2020.10 0 0 04 
666-6065/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articlecase importation and the non-elimination of local cases, 
which parallel economic and social issues from lockdown im- 
plementation. Sustainable and public-health orientated exit 
strategies are therefore required. We searched PubMed from 
database inception to May 20, 2020, for articles using the 
search terms “COVID-19”, “SARS-CoV-2”, “Exit Strategies”
“Lockdown” and “Control Measures”. Our search yielded three 
modelling papers of relevance. Two articles examined control 
strategies within Wuhan with one focusing on the effects of 
social mixing and the other on case isolation. Another esti- 
mated the efficacy of long-term social distancing in the US. 
We found no articles which modelled the impacts of national 
lockdown and exit strategies for countries within the West- 
ern Pacific outside of China. under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 


































































































t  Added value of this study 
This study investigates the use of a sustainable and 
public-health driven exit strategy for COVID-19, which allows 
for the immediate reopening of schools and gradual easing of 
workplace distancing. We find that the gradual release exit 
strategy proposed averts a substantial proportion of cases 
in comparison to a no exit strategy whilst simultaneously 
also reducing the epidemic peak size to reduce strain on the 
healthcare system. Such strategies can be deployed elsewhere 
in the region, dependent on the timing of lockdown and epi- 
demic stage of the country. 
Implications of all the available evidence 
The results of this study provides policy makers in Singa- 
pore and other countries with evidence that gradual release 
exit strategies can be implemented successfully if deployed 
effectively and in a timely manner. Such strategies alleviate 
burdens on social and economic well-being from lockdown, 
and maintain good healthcare provisioning with sufficient 
planning. 
Introduction 
In response to the rising number of local coronavirus dis-
ease 2019 (COVID-19) cases, many countries have implemented
lockdowns to restrict movement and community interactions
and thereby suppress infection. Details vary [1] but measures
commonly include the closure of premises such as non-essential
workplaces, schools, recreational facilities and places of worship.
Essential services in healthcare, transport, cleaning, food services
and supply chains may remain open to sustain the economy
and welfare of the population. Most lockdowns have successfully
reduced the reproduction number and curtailed epidemic growth,
but emerging from a lockdown prematurely without sufficient
planning may result in epidemic rebounding [2] , as the previous
suppression of cases may leave a substantial proportion of the
population susceptible to infection. Intermittent lockdowns have
been proposed [3] through the cycling of initiation and cessation of
these interventions—possibly until 2022—to avoid exceeding hospi-
tal capacities. Concerns exist, however, on the long-term economic
disruption, negative consequences on social and mental well-being,
and costly administration required to ensure compliance. 
Here, in the context of lockdown and social distancing mea-
sures, we explore the impact of a gradual release exit strategy
(GRES) with a rollback of social distancing interventions operating
outside of trigger mechanisms from emergency intermittent lock-
down measures. Health and isolation facility expansion and prepa-
ration will be required during the lockdown phase regardless of
control strategy to maintain a high standard of healthcare, which
can substantially reduce case fatality rates [4] . GRES can provide
timelines to government agencies, services and businesses, and al-
low society and the economy to return to a new-normal state with
continuing extensive education on the importance of safe distanc-
ing, hygiene practices and precautionary measures such as mask
wearing. We assess GRES through an agent-based model of a city,
modelled upon the city-state of Singapore. 
The implementation of social distancing measures in Singapore
has been progressive from 10 March with the rollout of gradually
stricter recommendations and regulations [5] , leading to the imple-
mentation of a ‘circuit breaker’ [6] , or lockdown, on 7 April 2020 in
response to rising autochthonous cases. Although Singapore’s lock-
down seemingly had no effect on several large outbreaks among
foreign worker dormitories that started in early April, it appears to
have arrested the epidemic growth in the general population, using
school closures and workplace distancing as recognized and effec-
tive attack rate reduction measures [ 7 , 8 ]. Substantial education androductivity losses are expected with all children tele-learning and
n estimated 80% non-essential employees working from home or
nable to work [9] . In response, a 3-tier financial support package
or businesses and individuals has been released to provide finan-
ial assistance for families, support networks, workers and students
mounting to ∼$38.8 billion USD [10] . On 21 April 2020, the Sin-
aporean Government announced an extension of social distancing
easures to 8 weeks in total with plans to end on 1 June 2020
11] . 
ethods 
We utilise the geographical, demographic and epidemiologi-
al model of Singapore for respiratory diseases (GeoDEMOS-R), an
gent-based epidemic simulation model comprising of a synthetic
nd calibrated population where the impact of interventions can
e measured. The model has been previously used to estimate the
ffects of early epidemic control [12] and of home versus institu-
ional isolation of cases [13] , and has been updated and expanded
o assess exit strategies. In summary, we investigate the effects of
arly social distancing, lockdown and GRES in 480 days by: 
(1) Establishing a limited control baseline with case isolation
and quarantining of family members only; 
(2) Measuring the impact of 6-week (early cessation), 8-week
(planned) and 9-week (extended) lockdown in duration, at
different start dates of 5, 6, 7 and 8 weeks, on the final
infection attack size, when compared to a no-exit strategy
where lockdown is immediately lifted; 
(3) Estimating the effects of this lockdown with GRES which in-
cludes the immediate re-opening of schools post lockdown,
due to their limited epidemic suppression impact [14] , with
a 3-month readjustment period. In the first 2 months, 50%
of the workforce returns physically to work, followed by 1
month at 75%, before full re-opening to pre-epidemic levels;
and 
(4) Comparing lockdown to a no-lockdown strategy with long-
term social distancing of differing start times at 5, 6, 7 and
8 weeks from the epidemic start date and durations of 2, 4,
6 and 8 weeks. During this period, 50% of the adult popula-
tion is actively working, schools are closed and active social
distancing is being done within the community. 
ummary of synthetic population generation 
The model used is GeoDEMOS-R, an agent-based epidemiologi-
al model with a synthetic resident population that is heavily cali-
rated to be representative. Full details are explained elsewhere;
12] here we provide a summary. Households were constructed
sing 178 census tables based on a sample of 20 0,0 0 0 house-
olds. An heuristic search algorithm was used to create a total
f 3.77 million Singaporeans with the attributes of age, ethnic-
ty and gender. Remaining attributes were drawn randomly from
he specified attribute’s marginal distribution and summary tables
f the population comparable to the census tables formed whose
t were assessed using Pearson’s chi-squared statistic. Zero count
ells were avoided by setting them to 0.1. Each attribute was fit-
ed using a Monte Carlo swapping algorithm, which swaps two
andom individuals’ data until the improvement in fit becomes
egligible ( < 0.001% improvement for 10,0 0 0 runs). The same pro-
ess was used to generate partners, allocate children and create
ulti-generational families for 1.14 million households. Households
ere geolocated within discrete areas named subzones according
o spatial characteristics outlined in the census, and individuals al-
ocated workplaces and schools appropriately based on distribu-
ions of commuting time data from Singapore’s Household Inter-



















































































































2  iew Travel Study and EZ-Link data which is a 1-month record of
he majority of the population’s public transport activities. 
ransmission model 
In the transmission model, day and night steps exist to differ-
ntiate movement behaviour and infection likelihood between in-
ividuals within the household, school, workplace and community.
uring the day, workers interacted with individuals in the same
orkgroup, and students within their classes. These two groups
lso interacted with those in the wider area around their work-
lace and school at community rates. Individuals who were not
orking or studying were modelled to interact with people in the
ame residential community. In the night step, individuals inter-
cted primarily within their households where children had the
ighest probability of contact with his or her family members. 
Suppose i and j are two individuals in the synthetic population
ith j becoming infected, we denote the probability of j infecting
 on day t in location type g as 
 i jg ( t ) = βg I 
(
t − t j 
)
. (1) 
Here βg is constant for location type g , defined as the home,
orkplace or school which both individuals belong to; βg is ob-
ained from a contact rate study (Supplementary Table 1, 2) for
ifferent social group settings in Singapore where the contact rates
erve as the likelihood for individuals to infect one another at spe-
ific group locations and the wider spatial subzone area. 
Overall, the probability of individual i getting infected from lo-
ation type g on day t is therefore given as, 
p G ( t ) = 1 | G | 
∑ 
j∈ G 
P i jg ( t ) = 
βg 
| G | 
∑ 
j∈ G t 
I 
(
t − t j 
)
. (2) 
Here G is a set of individuals of location type g, G t is the subset
f all individuals who belongs to set G and are infectious on day
 . We use | . | to denote the size of the set of individuals. Hence,
 G | is the total number of people in set G . The number of people in
et G that would be infected on day t can be denoted by a random
ariable X G ( t ) and 
 G ( t ) ∼ Bin ( | G | − | G t | −| G r | , p G ( t − 1 ) ) (3) 
here G r is the subset of G consisting of individuals that have been
emoved through hospitalisation and subsequent recovery. The to-
al number of people α infected on day t can then be expressed by
umming over all the different sets of individuals in the popula-
ion, 
( t ) = 
∑ 
G 
X G ( t ) . (4) 
For each simulation, the model was run for 480 days—
pproximately 15 months—to estimate the number of cases by the
nd of April 2021; cases began entering Singapore in January 2020.
odel parameterisation and fitting 
With more epidemiological information available, model
arameters that were previously based on the severe acute res-
iratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) have been updated
a summary of parameters and interventions is provided in Sup-
lementary Table 1). We assumed that the basic reproductive
umber ( R 0 ) for SARS-CoV-2 was 2.0 [15] , the asymptomatic rate
as 17.9% [16] and the incubation cumulative distribution function
as modified to have a median incubation period of 4 days [17] .
he R 0 parameter was built with a multiplier γ , which modified
he infectiousness parameter of each individual in the simulation
18] . We first simulate the initial 4 weeks for a selected γ ∈ [0,
]. This γ has a correspondence with r ∈ R , the value of thexponential model exp( rt + b 0 ) that best fits the simulated 4-week
utbreak. This value of r was used in the linearized form of
he susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed (SEIR) model [19] to 
ompute the corresponding R 0 . Through this process we obtained
 corresponding value of R 0 for γ . A grid search was performed
n γ , with γ that corresponded closest to R 0 = 2.0 being selected. 
For each scenario, we had case importation based on a Poisson
odel with λ= 2.0. To calculate λ, case importation data was used
o fit a model on the expected number of daily case importations,
here λ was the model’s average case importation over time. 
nterventions 
For this study, we ran 100 simulations for each intervention.
here was no limit to isolation capacity as we assumed that the
ajority of the symptomatic cases will be transferred to hospital
r community isolation facilities. Our baseline scenario included
he isolation of ascertained cases and home quarantine of their
ousehold members. All ascertained cases are assumed to have a
4-h delay before they are no longer infectious to the wider popu-
ation to accommodate for healthcare facility visitation and testing.
e additionally assumed perfect compliance of those under house-
old quarantine as strict punitive measures are in place. 
For lockdown, a harsher penalisation on the contact rate was
mplemented with an initial 2-week period of social distancing,
ollowed by a 6, 8 or 9-week period where schools remained
losed, and work and community contact rates are further reduced
o 20%. This further reduction is to simulate essential work and
conomic activity still being carried out by the population during
he lockdown period. The starting points were at week 5, 6, 7 and
 of the epidemic. 
For the post lockdown strategy, two scenarios were modelled.
he first assumed conditions went back to a pre-epidemic state
ith all schools, workplaces and the community at 100% trans-
ission. The second, labelled as the gradual release exit strategy
GRES), assumed a successive restoration of contact rates over a
eriod of three months. In the two months directly after lockdown,
chools reopen and contact levels are restored at 50%, followed by
 month of 75% restoration of workplace and community contact
evels, and then pre-epidemic contact rates at 100%. This repre-
ents a cautious and planned approach to avoid heavily abnormal
ontact disruption from the initial lockdown period whilst main-
aining a level of epidemic suppression. 
For a long-term social distancing strategy, school closure occurs
nd we assume 50% suppression in contact rates at workplaces and
ithin the wider community. This measure can begin at week 5, 6,
 and 8 where at each starting point, social distancing was imple-
ented for 2, 4, 6 and 8 weeks in duration. After the end of the
ocial distancing period, all schools were reopened with contacts
estored to pre-intervention levels. The two weeks of social dis-
ancing pre lock-down are also assumed to follow the same contact
ate reduction levels with school closure. 
We present the main results using a 17.9% asymptomatic pro-
ortion, and the same analysis for 44% in the Supplementary In-
ormation (Supplementary Figs. 1–4). 
esults 
imited control versus lockdown 
For the limited control baseline, the total number of infections
y 480 days was 815 40 0 (IQR: 814 60 0–816 50 0), which rep-
esents 21.62% (21.60–21.65%) of the total population ( Table 1 ) of
hich 669 500 were symptomatic (668 700–670 400). The peak of
he epidemic occurred at 62 days (59–63 days) or 7 weeks with
5,80 0 (25 60 0–26 20 0) infected daily ( Fig. 1 ). In comparison, the
4 B.L. Dickens, J.R. Koo and J.T. Lim et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific 1 (2020) 10 0 0 04 
Table 1 
Final infection attack size of population at 480 days under 6, 8 and 9-week lockdown (LD) with and without a gradual release exit strategy (GRES) in 100 simulations. The 
baseline infection attack size is 815 400 (814 600–816 500) infections. The proportion of infections relative to the total population are presented in italics. 
Implementation 
Timing 
6-Week LD 6-Week 
LD + GRES 
8-Week LD 8-week 
LD + GRES 
9-Week LD 9-Week 
LD + GRES 
Week 5 796 900 (791 
800–799 300) 
700 700 (699 
000 – 702 800) 
794 100 (790 
500 – 798 300) 
693 700 (691 
000 – 695 700) 
793 000 (789 
500 – 796 900) 
689 400 (686 
800 – 692 200) 
21.13% 18.58% 21.06% 18.39% 21.03% 18.28% 
Week 6 750 500 (743 
100–756 200) 
690 400 (688 
300 – 692 000) 
749 700 (741 
500 – 754 300) 
689 400 (686 
800 – 691 500) 
748 400 (741 
600 – 753 800) 
688 000 (685 
500 – 690 200) 
19.90% 18.31% 19.88% 18.28% 19.84% 18.24% 
Week 7 680 500 (669 
900–686 700) 
673 400 (663 
800 – 679 700) 
679 400 (669 
300 – 686 800) 
673 000 (663 
700 – 680 800) 
678 200 (668 
800 – 686 300) 
672 900 (663 
800 – 679 400) 
18.04% 17.86% 18.02% 17.85% 17.98% 17.84% 
Week 8 591 500 (577 
800 – 600 100) 
580 200 (562 
000 – 595 100) 
586 600 (573 
300 – 597 000) 
576 000 (558 
600 – 591 000) 
585 400 (573 
200 – 597 500) 
575 500 (556 
600 – 592 400) 





































































































Fig. 1. Daily new infections with lockdown measures implemented at week 5, 6, 
7, 8 (a), (c), (e), (g) with corresponding cumulative values (b), (d), (f), (h) in 100 
simulations. Each coloured line represents one of 100 simulations with the darker 
corresponding coloured line representing the median. The dark grey banded region 
represents 6-week lockdown (LD), medium grey the additional 2 weeks of lock- 
down totalling at 8 weeks, the light grey the gradual release exit strategy (GRES) 
for the 6-week lockdown, and the very light grey the delayed 2-weeks of GRES due 
to the longer implementation of the 8-week lockdown. The initial two weeks of 



















































a  use of an early lockdown at 5 weeks with no exit strategy has a
final infection attack size of 796 900 (791 800–799 300), 794 100
(790 50 0–798 30 0) and 793 0 0 0 (789 50 0–796 90 0) for early 6-
week cessation, planned 8-week and prolonged 9-week lockdown
respectively. The number of cases averted represents 2.27% (18
50 0), 2.61% (21 30 0) and 2.75% (22 400) of the baseline infectedopulation. This is reduced to 591 500 (577 800–600 100), 586
0 0 (573 30 0–597 0 0 0) and 585 40 0 (573 20 0–597 50 0) for a late
ockdown starting at week 8, with corresponding proportions of
7.46%, 28.06% and 28.21% averted. 
A delayed post lockdown secondary peak size of 6060 (5260–
740) daily cases occurs for a 6-week lockdown duration starting
t week 7, which is reduced further to 5890 (5040–6590) for an 8-
eek lockdown in duration ( Fig. 1 (e)). Whilst substantially lower
han the baseline peak, the initial pre-lockdown peak is relatively
igh. This peak is suppressed however for a lockdown starting at
eek 6 ( Fig. 1 (c)). Although the secondary peak is greater at 14
00 (13 200–15 000) and 13 900 (12 800–14 700) daily cases re-
pectively, it represents peak suppression throughout the epidemic
n comparison to the baseline. 
Lockdown start time has a larger impact than duration as rela-
ively small ranges in the cases averted exist; 18 500–22 400, 64
0 0–67 0 0 0, 134 90 0–137 20 0 and 223 90 0–230 0 0 0 total cases at
, 6, 7 and 8-week start times across durations of 6, 8 and 9 weeks
espectively. 
For an asymptomatic rate of 44%, the total number of infections
y 480 days rose to 1 085 0 0 0 (1 084 0 0 0–1 086 0 0 0), represent-
ng a 24.9% increase in the infected population. 
RES versus no exit strategy 
For lockdown and GRES, early lockdown at 5-weeks had a final
nfection attack size of 700 700 (699 000–702 800) total cases for
 6-week lockdown, 693 700 (691 000–695 700) for 8-week lock-
own, and 689 400 (686 80 0–692 20 0) for a 9-week lockdown
 Table 1 ). The proportion averted in comparison to the baseline
as 14.07%, 14.93% and 15.45%, respectively. This was reduced to
80 200 (562 000–595 100), 576 000 (558 600–591 000) and 575
0 0 (556 60 0–592 40 0) for an 8-week start time respectively, with
 corresponding proportion of 28.06–29.42% cases averted. 
Overall, when compared to the baseline, GRES averts 114 700–
26 0 0 0, 125 0 0 0–127 40 0, 142 0 0 0–142 50 0, 235 20 0–239 90 0
ases at lockdown start dates of 5, 6, 7 and 8 weeks for the dura-
ions of 6, 8, and 9 weeks. 
Lockdown start time has a large impact on GRES ( Fig. 1 and
able 1 ). With early lockdown implementation at 5 weeks, when
ompared to no-exit strategy, GRES averts an average of 96 200
ases (12.07%) in total for a 6-week early cessation lockdown, 100
00 (12.64%) for the planned 8-week and 103 600 (13.06%) for the
rolonged 9-week. At this 5-week start time, GRES also reduces
he secondary peak size by 9 900 (46.92%), 10 100 (49.03%) and
0 200 (50.25%) at a ∼28-day delay respectively ( Fig. 1 (a)). If im-
lemented later and close to the epidemic peak at week 8, the
fficacy of GRES diminishes with 11 300 (1.91%), 10 600 (1.81%)
nd 9900 (1.69%) cases averted in total, with no determinable sec-
B.L. Dickens, J.R. Koo and J.T. Lim et al. / The Lancet Regional Health - Western Pacific 1 (2020) 10 0 0 04 5 
Table 2 
Final infection attack size of population at 480 days under social distancing of 2, 4, 6, 8-week duration in 100 simulations. The proportion of infections relative to the total 
population are presented in italics. 
Implementation Timing 2-Week 4-Week 6-Week 8-Week 
Week 5 820 100 (818 500 – 821 400) 804 900 (801 300 – 808 000) 783 600 (779 000 – 786,300) 759 000 (753 800 – 763 000) 
21.75% 21.34% 20.78% 20.13% 
Week 6 802 700 (799 500 – 805 000) 770 400 (765 400 – 774 900) 737 200 (729 700 – 743 000) 710 700 (705 800 – 716 800) 
21.28% 20.43% 19.55% 18.85% 
Week 7 768 300 (763 300 – 771 300) 20.37% 713 900 (706 300 – 720 800) 674 600 (666 300 – 680 400) 650 300 (642 900 – 658 600) 
18.93% 17.89% 17.24% 
Week 8 723 900 (719 000 – 727 900) 650 900 (645 200 – 655 800) 606 700 (601 800 – 612 600) 583 200 (578 500 – 587 500) 
























































































































































Fig. 2. Daily new infections with social distancing measures implemented at week 
5, 6, 7, 8 (a), (c), (e), (g) with corresponding cumulative values (b), (d), (f), (h) in 100 
simulations. Each coloured line represents one of 100 simulations with the darker 
corresponding coloured line representing the median. The white bands highlight 












q  ndary peak ( Fig. 1 ). GRES’ lessening utility with later lockdown
tart times is due to a large proportion of cases having already oc-
urred in the first half of the epidemic. 
Post lockdown peak sizes for a 6 week start time lockdown
trategy are substantially reduced with 8740 (8580–8980), 8760
8590–8930) and 8850 (8650–8980) daily cases for a 6, 8 and 9-
eek duration lockdown with GRES and 14 100 (13 20 0–15 0 0 0),
3 900 (12 800–14 700) and 13 800 (12 800–14 700), respectively,
ithout ( Table 1 ). This represents a 38.01, 36.98% and 35.87% re-
uction. For an earlier implementation lockdown time at 5 weeks,
 47.92%, 49.03% and 50.25% corresponding post lockdown peak re-
uction is observed. 
Lockdown duration had a limited impact on GRES, acting as
 suppressive, not a preventative, measure. When utilising the 6-
eek early cessation, planned 8-week lockdown and prolonged 9-
eek lockdown, a difference of 89 10 0, 94 0 0 0 and 98 300 cases
an be averted across the different start dates of 5, 6, 7 and 8
eeks using GRES in comparison to lockdown alone; differing only
y 9200 cases between these duration times. 
At a greater asymptomatic proportion of 44% we observed sim-
lar outcomes in terms of cumulative infection numbers for lock-
own implementation on week 5 and 6 (Supplementary Figs. 1
nd 2) although it represented an overall accelerated epidemic. The
argest difference was observed for a 6-week lockdown with GRES
t week 5 where 833 600 (827 700–837 400) infections were ob-
erved in comparison to 700 700 (699 000–702 800) at an 17.9%
symptomatic rate. 
RES vs. long term social distancing 
Long term social distancing at durations of 2, 4, 6 and 8-weeks
ause resulting final infection attack sizes of 820 100 (818 500–821
0 0), 804 90 0 (801 30 0–808 0 0 0), 783 60 0 (779 0 0 0–786 30 0)
nd 759 0 0 0 (753 80 0–763 0 0 0) total cases across implementation
tart times of 5, 6, 7 and 8 weeks ( Table 2 ). Post social distancing
eak sizes show suppression, particularly for implementation times
f week 7, although if implemented at week 6, the initial peak is
lso reduced ( Fig. 2 ). 
The secondary peaks caused by early lockdown and GRES are
omparable to long-term social distancing with 50% activity in
he community and the workplace, wherein 6-week interventions
tarting at week 7 cause a maximum of 5390 (4750–6070) cases
or the former and 5490 (4710–6040) cases in the latter ( Fig. 2 (e)).
ong term social distancing is less effective at durations of 4 weeks
r lower, averting up to 1.29% of cases relative to the baseline for
n implementation time at 5 weeks ( Table 2 ). For a duration of
wo weeks in social distancing, a maximum of 11.22% of cases rel-
tive to the baseline can be averted if implemented close to the
pidemic peak at 8 weeks. 
For longer durations of 6 to 8 weeks, 3.90–6.92%, 9.59–12.84%,
7.27–20.25% and 25.59–28.48% of cases can be averted relative to
he baseline for start dates of 5, 6, 7 and 8 weeks respectively.
or a week 6 implementation time, 12.84% of cases can be avertedith 8 weeks of social distancing relative to the baseline in com-
arison to 8 weeks of lockdown and GRES at 15.45%. 
At an asymptomatic ratio of 44%, 2-week social distancing im-
lemented on week 5 was the least effective, which resulted in 1
 07 0 0 0 cumulative infections (995 60 0–1 017 0 0 0). This was the
nly scenario where the cumulative number of infections breached
 million cases (Supplementary Figs. 3 and 4). 
iscussion 
Critical uncertainties lie ahead on moving forward during lock-
own periods in when and how to release the population back to
 new normal state. Our findings suggest that earlier lockdown re-
uires a GRES to prevent a large secondary peak, which becomes


























































































































less important the later the lockdown is implemented. As Singa-
pore entered lockdown relatively early where ∼100 cases were be-
ing reported daily, a lockdown with no exit strategy could result
in up to 796 900 (791 800–799 300) total cases across 480 days,
which averts 2.27% of cases in comparison to the baseline. GRES
can avert up to 14% of cases for the same scenario. For lockdowns
implemented at later weeks, substantial proportions of cases are
averted, as observed for other epidemics [20] , with a final infection
attack size of 591 500 (577 80 0–60 0 10 0) at week 8 as an exam-
ple, although this will not be viable for most countries where their
healthcare capacity cannot cope with large, early epidemic peaks. 
When GRES is compared with no exit strategy for a 5 and 6-
week implementation start time, it results in a reduction of 8.01–
13.06% in final infection attack size, and 0.78–1.91% reduction for a
7 and 8 week start time as a large proportion of cases have already
occurred in the initial epidemic ramp up. GRES therefore shows
good utility in populations where substantial proportions are sus-
ceptible to infection, reducing the overall outbreak size and slow-
ing down infection spread with a greater number of transmission
events prevented. This may provide opportunity to introduce pro-
phylaxis or vaccination measures in the future, or allow the imple-
mentation of mandatory testing of all incoming travellers, which
can prevent these infection events from occurring altogether as
the epidemic dies out. This is especially paramount as the num-
ber of cases beyond 365 days, although considerably lower than
the initial peaks, still ranges from 6.51–513.21 cases per day for
GRES strategies (Supplementary Table 3a) and 4.94–90.03 for long
term social distancing strategies (Supplementary Table 3b) with
the ongoing risk of secondary case spread from imported cases.
At the start of the epidemic however, the duration of lockdown
has a limited impact on the efficacy of GRES in terms of final in-
fection attack size, which suggests that the period should be used
for epidemic preparation rather than an ongoing control method,
although an extended lockdown of 8 or 9 weeks will avert more
cases. 
Should medical capacity permit, long term social distancing
remains a viable strategy provided it is carried out for a duration
of at least 6 weeks with 50% of the population working and
schools closed. The total infection attack size is less for social
distancing relative to lockdown with no exit strategy, but remains
greater than GRES which is the most effective strategy. For over-
all peak size minimization, both a social distancing and GRES
implementation time of 6 weeks is optimal, although if earlier
lockdowns or social distancing measures have been implemented,
GRES is essential for peak reduction. With a greater asymptomatic
rate of 44%, the epidemic is considerably accelerated requiring
earlier intervention at 4 or 5 weeks to slow infection spread. GRES
remains effective at a 23.1% reduction in the final infection attack
size in comparison to the baseline although these implementation
dates are notably much later into the epidemic in comparison to
the 17.9% asymptomatic proportion findings. 
Multiple complexities exist in the framing of exit strategies to
the public, including the attribution of accountability among pol-
icymakers and individuals, the acceptance of uncertain economic
burdens, and need for flexibility as technologies emerge and other
countries respond differently as the epidemic progresses. Lock-
down and GRES can maintain public preparation, awareness and
adherence which may abate if complete cessation and re-initiation
of measures are introduced for extensively long periods, as ob-
served generally for long-term therapies and lifestyle changes [21] .
The strategy also partially mitigates isolation fatigue and social dis-
ruption, and should be conducted along with case finding, contact-
tracing and quarantining, mass-testing in key groups such as those
working with vulnerable populations, and serological surveys. With
GRES in place, which will still require healthcare system ramp-up,
real-time forecasting efforts can also continue to estimate appro-riate intervention trigger times should another lockdown be re-
uired. Investment into the healthcare system to accommodate for
he caseloads estimated in the study could avoid recurrent lock-
owns, if the healthcare system can cope with the number of se-
ere cases. 
The prolonged flattening, not elimination, of the epidemic
cross scenarios is due to the constant influx of a conservative 2
stimated imported cases per day at the global travel hub, an es-
imated 17.9% (or 44%) prevalence of asymptomatic infections and
nevitable future relaxation of travel restrictions to allow for in-
uxes of short and long-term worker immigration. Additionally,
ontainment measures and lockdowns vary widely in duration and
everity between countries, [1] causing differing and delayed epi-
emic peaks among source countries, making lockdown a tempo-
ary protection measure against highly uncertain external epidemi-
logical forces where delays in reactive control measures abroad
r within Singapore will result in inevitable national case spread.
lthough seroprevalence data has yet to be released, due to the
ngoing lockdown measures, a substantial proportion of the popu-
ation is suspected of being susceptible to infection, which exacer-
ates the effects of case importation. 
Ongoing concerns regarding the effects of school closure remain
t the forefront of COVID-19 control policy. GRES prioritises school
e-opening as clinical manifestations of children’s COVID-19 appear
enerally less severe [22] . The societal impacts of school closure
mong young children, working adult parents and older children in
erms of productivity and education loss are likely to be extensive
nd unsustainable. With continued school closure, socioeconomic
nequalities will be further exacerbated, despite governmental in-
ervention to provide intensive distance learning for all school chil-
ren [23] . Overall, outside of education, schools operate as a safety
et for at-risk children, providing nutritional, emotional and social
upport as well as vaccinations and development opportunities. 
Limitations of this study include uncertainties on the current
umber of infections, which could not be used directly to validate
he initial phase of the epidemic in the agent-based model. Pa-
ameter estimations from larger global studies were therefore used
o simulate epidemics although wide ranges in observations con-
inue to be reported for parameters such as asymptomatic rates.
he model can be calibrated in the future with real time forecast-
ng effort s and result s of serology surveys to better reflect COVID-
9 prevalence and incidence within Singapore. Intra workplace and
chool contact patterns were additionally not accounted for, which
ay cause greater or fewer localized contact events depending on
nternal grouping structures. 
Further uncertainties include the current and future adherence
o social distancing measures, future importation rates and spatial
eterogeneities in infection rates. Ongoing epidemics in high den-
ity accommodation (Supplementary Figure 5) and their effects in
he wider community were also not accounted for, which requires
urther investigation. 
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